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The Breakup of the Euro Area
Barry Eichengreen
1.1    Introduction
The possibility of the breakup of the euro area was already being mooted, 
even before the single currency existed.1 These scenarios were then lent new 
life ﬁ  ve or six years on, when appreciation of the euro against the dollar and 
problems of slow growth in various member states led politicians to blame 
the European Central Bank (ECB) for disappointing economic perfor-
mance.2 Highly placed oﬃcials, possibly including members of the govern-
ing council of the German central bank, reportedly discussed the possibility 
that one or more participants might withdraw from the monetary union.3 
How seriously should we take these scenarios? And how much should we 
care? How signiﬁ  cant, in other words, would be the economic and political 
consequences?
The conclusion of the author is that it is unlikely that one or more mem-
bers of the euro area will leave in the next ten years and that the total dis-
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1. See, for example, Garber (1998) and Scott (1998).
2. Appreciation of the euro against the dollar (and against Asian currencies pegged to the 
dollar) ﬁ  rst occurred in 2002 to 2004. In June 2005, Italian Welfare Minister Roberto Maroni 
declared that “the euro has to go” and called for the reintroduction of the lira. The then prime 
minister Silvio Berlusconi followed by calling the euro “a disaster.”
3. Bundesbank president Axel Weber dismissed as “absurd” reports that he had taken part 
in such a meeting (Expatica 2005, 1).12    Barry  Eichengreen
integration of the euro area is more unlikely still.4 The technical diﬃculties 
of reintroducing a national currency should not be minimized. Nor is it 
obvious that the economic problems of the participating member states 
can be signiﬁ  cantly ameliorated by abandoning the euro, although neither 
can this possibility be dismissed. And even if there are immediate economic 
beneﬁ  ts, there may be longer-  term economic costs and political costs of an 
even more serious nature. Still, as Cohen (2000, 180) puts it, “In a world of 
sovereign states . . . nothing can be regarded as truly irreversible.” Policy 
analysts should engage in contingency planning, even if the contingency in 
question has a low probability.
The remainder of this chapter considers such scenarios in more detail. 
While it is widely argued that the technical and legal obstacles to a country 
unilaterally reintroducing its national currency are surmountable, it will be 
argued here that the associated diﬃculties could in fact be quite serious. 
To be sure, there are multiple historical examples of members of monetary 
unions introducing a national currency. It has also been suggested that the 
legal problems associated with the redenomination of contracts can be 
overcome, as they were when the ruble zone broke up or when Germany 
replaced the mark with the reichsmark in 1923/  1924. But changing from an 
old money to a new one is more complicated today than it was in Germany 
in the 1920s or in the former Soviet Union in the 1990s. Computer code must 
be rewritten. Automated teller machines must be reprogrammed. Advance 
planning will be required for the process to go smoothly, as was the case 
with the introduction of the physical euro in 2002. Moreover, abandoning 
the euro will presumably entail lengthy political debate and the passage of a 
bill by a national parliament or legislature, also over an extended period of 
time. Meanwhile, there will be an incentive for agents who are anticipating 
the redenomination of their claims into the national currency, followed by 
depreciation of the latter, to rush out of domestic banks and ﬁ  nancial assets, 
precipitating a banking and ﬁ  nancial collapse. Limiting the negative reper-
cussions would be a major technical and policy challenge for a government 
contemplating abandonment of the euro.
The economic obstacles revolve around the question of how debt ser-
vicing costs, interest rate spreads, and interest rate-  sensitive forms of eco-
nomic activity would respond to a country’s departure from the euro area.5 
A widespread presumption is that departure from the euro area would be 
associated with a signiﬁ  cant rise in spreads and debt-  servicing costs. But 
4. Note that I have violated the ﬁ  rst rule of forecasting: give them a forecast or give them a 
date, but never give them both. The point is that over horizons longer than ten years, so many 
things could change that forecasting becomes prohibitively diﬃcult. But I will later turn to the 
question of long-  term developments.
5. There is also the question of whether other EU member states would retaliate against a 
country reintroducing and depreciating its national currency with trade sanctions—considered 
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further reﬂ  ection suggests that the consequences will depend on why a coun-
try leaves. (The defector could conceivably be a Germany, concerned with 
politicization of ECB policy and inﬂ  ationary bias, rather than an Italy, fac-
ing slow growth and an exploding public debt.) They will depend on whether 
credible alternatives to the ECB and the Stability and Growth Pact are put 
in place at the national level (whether national central bank independence 
is strengthened and credible ﬁ  scal reforms are adopted at the same time that 
the exchange rate is reintroduced and depreciated). It seems likely that there 
would be economic costs but that these could be minimized by appropriate 
institutional reforms.
The political costs are likely to be particularly serious. The Treaty on Euro-
pean Union makes no provision for exit. Exit by one member would raise 
doubts about the future of the monetary union and would likely precipitate 
a further shift out of euro-  denominated assets, which would not please the 
remaining members. It might damage the balance sheets of banks in other 
countries with investments in the one abandoning the euro. Diplomatic ten-
sion and political acrimony would follow, and cooperation on nonmonetary 
issues would suﬀer. The defector would be relegated to second-  tier status 
in intra-  European discussions of nonmonetary issues. And, insofar as they 
attach value to their participation in this larger process of European integra-
tion, incumbents will be reluctant to leave.
The chapter starts by describing scenarios, revolving around high unem-
ployment and high inﬂ  ation, under which euro area participants may wish 
to leave. The immediately subsequent sections then evaluate the economic, 
political, procedural, and legal obstacles to doing so. An empirical section 
provides evidence on the realism of the exit scenarios by using survey data 
from the Eurobarometer and on the economic barriers by using data on the 
impact of euro adoption on commercial credit ratings. Following that is a 
discussion of reforms that might attenuate dissatisfaction with the opera-
tion of the single currency. A coda immediately preceding the conclusion 
discusses the implications of the 2008 ﬁ  nancial crisis in Europe for the argu-
ments of this chapter.
1.2    Scenarios
Diﬀerent countries could abandon the euro for diﬀerent reasons. One can 
imagine a country like Portugal, suﬀering from high labor costs and chronic 
slow growth, reintroducing the escudo in an eﬀort to engineer a sharp real 
depreciation and to export its way back to full employment. Alternatively, 
one can imagine a country like Germany, upset that the ECB has come 
under pressure from governments to relax its commitment to price stability, 
reintroducing the deutschemark in order to avoid excessive inﬂ  ation.
These diﬀerent scenarios would have diﬀerent implications for whether 
defection implies breakup—that is, for whether one country’s leaving reduces 14    Barry  Eichengreen
the incentive for others to remain. In the case of Portuguese defection, the 
residual members might suﬀer a further loss of export competitiveness, 
while in the event of German exit, they might ﬁ  nd their competitiveness 
enhanced. Speciﬁ  cally, if other countries are similarly experiencing high 
unemployment associated with inadequate international competitiveness, 
then Portugal’s leaving will aggravate the pain felt by the others and may 
lead them to follow suit—but Germany’s leaving may have no, or even the 
opposite, eﬀect. Similarly, if discomfort with the inﬂ  ationary stance of ECB 
policy is shared by other countries, then Germany’s leaving, by removing 
one voice and vote for price stability, may heighten the incentive for others 
to do likewise.
More generally, if the country that leaves is an outlier in terms of its 
preferences over central bank policy, then its defection might better enable 
the remaining participants to secure an ECB policy more to their liking, in 
which case the likelihood of further defection and general breakup would be 
reduced. Disagreements over the stance of policy being an obvious reason 
why a participating member state would be disaﬀected, one might think that 
the defector would automatically be an outlier in terms of its preferences 
over central bank policy. But this is by no means certain: countries whose 
preferences diﬀer insigniﬁ  cantly from those of other members could choose 
to defect for other reasons—for example, in response to an exceptionally 
severe asymmetric shock, or because of disagreements over noneconomic 
issues.6
And if the country that leaves is small, this would be unlikely to much 
aﬀect the incentives of other members to continue operating a monetary 
union that is valued primarily for its corollary beneﬁ  ts. The contribution of 
the euro to enhancing price stability would not be signiﬁ  cantly diminished 
by the defection of one small member.7 The impetus for ﬁ  nancial deepen-
ing ascribed to the single currency would not be signiﬁ  cantly diminished.8 
If Portugal left the euro area, would the other members notice? Even if it 
used its monetary autonomy to engineer a substantial real depreciation, 
would its euro area neighbors experience a signiﬁ  cant loss of competitive-
ness and feel serious pain?
On the other hand, if Germany defected, the size of the euro area would 
decline by more than a quarter. This would imply signiﬁ  cant diminution of 
the scale of the market over which the beneﬁ  ts of the euro were felt in terms 
of increased price transparency and ﬁ  nancial deepening. Countries balanc-
ing these beneﬁ  ts against the costs of being denied their optimal national 
6. These issues were analyzed in an inﬂ  uential early article by Alesina and Grilli (1993).
7. The literature on price transparency and the euro is reviewed by Mathä (2003).
8. On the stimulus to the development of European ﬁ  nancial markets, see Bishop (2000) and 
Biais et al. (2006). On the corollary beneﬁ  ts of monetary union more generally, see Mongelli 
and Vega (2006).The Breakup of the Euro Area    1 5
monetary policy might ﬁ  nd themselves tipped against membership. Defec-
tion by a few could then result in general disintegration.
In practice, a variety of asymmetric shocks could slow growth and raise 
unemployment in a euro area member state and create pressure for a real 
depreciation. The shocks that have attracted the most attention are those 
highlighted in Blanchard’s model of rotating slumps (Blanchard 2006). The 
advent of the euro has brought credibility beneﬁ  ts to members whose com-
mitment to price stability was previously least ﬁ  rm and whose interest rates 
were previously high.9 Enhanced expectations of price stability have brought 
down domestic interest rates, bidding up bond, stock, and housing prices. 
Foreign capital has ﬂ  ooded in to take advantage of this convergence play. 
The cost of capital having declined, investment rises in the short run, and 
as households feel positive wealth eﬀects, consumption rises as well. The 
capital inﬂ  ow has as its counterpart a current account deﬁ  cit. In the short 
run, the result is an economic boom, driven ﬁ  rst and foremost by residential 
construction, with falling unemployment and rising wages.
But once the capital stock adjusts to the higher levels implied by the lower 
cost of capital, the boom comes to an end. Unless the increase in capital 
stock signiﬁ  cantly raises labor productivity (which is unlikely insofar as 
much of the preceding period’s investment took the form of residential 
construction), the result is a loss of cost competitiveness. The country then 
faces slow growth, chronic high unemployment, and grinding deﬂ  ation, as 
weak labor market conditions force wages to fall relative to those prevailing 
elsewhere in the euro area. The temptation, then, is to leave the euro zone so 
that monetary policy can be used to reverse the erosion of competitiveness 
with a “healthy” dose of inﬂ  ation.
This particular scenario has attracted attention, because it suggests that 
the tensions that could eventually result in defections from the euro area 
are intrinsic to the operation of the European Monetary Union (EMU). 
It suggests that the intra-euro-area divergences that are their source are 
direct consequences of the monetary union’s operation. This story tracks 
the experience of Portugal since the mid- 1990s—ﬁ  rst boom, then overvalu-
ation, and ﬁ  nally slump. There are signs of similar problems in Italy, where 
the diﬃculties caused by slow growth are compounded by the existence of 
a heavy public debt, and in Spain, which experienced many of the same 
dynamics as Portugal. The implication is that Greece and Slovenia (and 
future EMU members such as Estonia and Latvia) will then follow.10
9. Beneﬁ  ts that in some sense reﬂ  ect the operation of the barriers to exit are described 
later.
10. One can also argue that Greece and Slovenia will have learned from the problems of 
Portugal, Spain, and Italy, and that they will take preventive measures—aggressively tightening 
ﬁ  scal policy, for example, to prevent capital inﬂ  ows from fueling an unsustainable construction-
  led investment boom and leading to a consequent loss of competitiveness. In this view, the 
negative shocks experienced by the ﬁ  rst cohort of convergence economies may not be felt by 
their successors.16    Barry  Eichengreen
1.3      Economic Barriers to Exit
But would reintroducing the national currency and following with a sharp 
depreciation against the euro in fact help to solve these countries’ competi-
tiveness and debt problems? The presumption in much of the literature is 
negative.11 A country like Italy—where slow growth combines with high 
inherited debt/  gross domestic product (GDP) ratios to raise the specter of 
debt unsustainability (that it would become necessary to restructure the 
debt or for taxpayers and transfer recipients to make inconceivable sacri-
ﬁ  ces)—might be tempted to reintroduce the lira as a way of securing a more 
inﬂ  ationary monetary policy and of depreciating away the value of the debt, 
but doing so would result in credit rating downgrades, higher sovereign 
spreads, and an increase in interest costs, as investors anticipate and react to 
the government’s actions. A country like Portugal—where high real wages 
combine with the absence of exchange rate independence to produce chronic 
high unemployment—might be tempted to reintroduce the escudo as a way 
of securing a more expansionary monetary policy and of pushing down 
labor costs, but doing so will only result in higher wage inﬂ  ation, as workers 
anticipate and react to the government’s actions. Estimates in Blanchard 
(2006) suggest that Portugal would require a 25 percent real depreciation 
in order to restore its competitiveness.12 It is not clear that workers would 
look the other way if the government sought to engineer this through a 
substantial nominal depreciation. Observers pointing to these eﬀects con-
clude that exiting might not be especially beneﬁ  cial for a country with high 
debts or high unemployment. To the contrary, the principal obstacle to 
exiting the euro area in this view is that doing so may have signiﬁ  cant eco-
nomic costs.
Yet, one can also imagine circumstances in which reintroducing the na-
tional currency might constitute a useful treatment. Assume that Portuguese 
workers are prepared to accept a reduction in their real wages, but they 
confront a coordination problem: they are willing to accept a reduction 
only if other workers or unions accept a reduction, perhaps because they 
care about relative wages.13 Under these circumstances, there will be a reluc-
tance to move ﬁ  rst, and wage adjustment will be suboptimally slow. Then, a 
monetary-  cum-  exchange rate policy that jumps up the price level, reducing 
real wages across the board, may be welfare enhancing; this is the so-  called 
“daylight savings time” argument for a ﬂ  exible exchange rate. Importantly, 
in the circumstances described here, there will be no incentive for individual 
workers or unions to push for higher wages to oﬀset the increase in prices. The 
11. See, for example, Gros (2007).
12. Absent further divergences in productivity growth.
13. Or perhaps it is because the aggregate rate of growth, from which everyone beneﬁ  ts, 
depends on the national average level of costs. One can imagine still other formulations of this 
coordination problem. A survey is Cooper (1999).The Breakup of the Euro Area    1 7
lower real wages obtained as a result of depreciating the newly reintroduced 
currency deliver the economy to the same full- employment equilibrium that 
would have resulted from years of grinding deﬂ  ation, only faster.
Note the assumption here: whatever caused real wages to get out of line in 
the ﬁ  rst place is not intrinsic to the economy, so the problem will not recur. 
Thus, the Portuguese example contemplated here is described under the 
assumption that real wages have fallen out of line for reasons extrinsic to the 
operation of the economy—for example, irrational exuberance on the part 
of workers in the run-  up to Stage 3 of the Maastricht process, something 
that will not recur. If, on the other hand, real wages are too high because of 
the existence of domestic distortions—for example, the presence of pow-
erful trade unions that exclusively value the welfare of their employed mem-
bers—then it is implausible that a diﬀerent  monetary- cum- exchange  rate 
policy will have an enduring impact.
There are similar counterarguments to the view that a country like Italy 
that reintroduced the lira in order to pursue a monetary- cum- exchange rate 
policy that stepped down the value of the debt would necessarily be penal-
ized with lower credit ratings and higher debt-  servicing costs. Sovereign 
debt is a contingent claim; when debt is rendered unsustainable by shocks 
not of the government’s own making, and the source of those shocks can 
be veriﬁ  ed independently, there are theoretical arguments for why investors 
will see a write-  down as excusable.14 Even when the country’s debt problem 
is of its own making, credible institutional and policy reforms—strict legal 
or constitutional limits on future budget deﬁ  cits, stronger independence to 
insulate the central bank from pressure to help ﬁ  nance future debts—may 
reassure the markets that past losses will not recur. The fact that the debt bur-
den has been lightened similarly makes it look less likely that prior problems 
will be repeated. There is ample evidence from history that governments that 
default, either explicitly by restructuring or implicitly by inﬂ  ating, are able 
to regain market access by following appropriate institutional and policy 
reforms. The mixed ﬁ  ndings of studies seeking to identify a reputational 
penalty in the form of higher interest rates are consistent with the view that 
this penalty can be avoided by countries that follow up with institutional and 
policy reforms, reassuring investors that the experience will not be repeated. 
The implication is that the cost in terms of reputation may not be a prohibi-
tive barrier to exit.
How applicable is this scenario to countries like Italy? It is hard to argue 
that Italy’s heavy debt burden is due to factors not of its own making. Italy 
does not have a reassuring history of guarding the central bank’s inde-
pendence or of adopting budgetary procedures and institutions that limit 
free-  rider and common-  pool problems. Whether exiting the euro area and 
reintroducing the lira would therefore result in credit rating downgrades 
14. See, for example, Grossman and Van Huyck (1998).18    Barry  Eichengreen
and increases in spreads suﬃcient to deter any such decision is an empirical 
question.15
The other economic barrier to exit cited in this connection is that a coun-
try that abandoned the euro and reintroduced its national currency might 
be denied the privileges of the single market. A country that reintroduced 
its national currency at levels that stepped down its labor costs by 20 percent 
might be required to pay a 20 percent compensatory duty when export-
ing to other members of the European Union, reﬂ  ecting concerns that it 
was unfairly manipulating its currency and solving its economic problems 
at the expense of its neighbors. Whatever the compensatory tariﬀ, collect-
ing it would require the reestablishment of customs posts and border con-
trols, adding to transactions costs. Other states might seek to tax foreign 
investment outﬂ  ows on the grounds that the defector was using an unfair 
monetary-  cum-  exchange rate policy to attract foreign direct investment. In 
this climate of ill will and recrimination, they might seek to limit the freedom 
of movement of its citizens.
But it is not clear that other member states could or would respond in this 
way. Sweden, Denmark, the United Kingdom, and all but one of the new 
member states have their own national currencies, yet they are not denied 
the privileges of the single market. If Germany, Italy, or Portugal decided to 
join their ranks, it is not clear that it could be treated any diﬀerently under 
European law. To be sure, the United Kingdom, Sweden, the Czech Repub-
lic, Hungary, and Poland do not presently participate in the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism II (ERM-  II), and therefore there are no formal restrictions on 
the currencies’ ﬂ  uctuation. It can be objected that these countries anchor 
their monetary policies by inﬂ  ation targeting, which frees them of accusa-
tions that they are manipulating their currencies relative to the euro. But a 
country like Germany that left the euro area out of dissatisfaction with the 
ECB’s inﬂ  ationary bias would presumably do likewise.16 Even a country 
abandoning the euro because it saw a need to step up the price level as a way 
of addressing debt and unemployment problems might then adopt inﬂ  ation 
targeting as a way of avoiding reputational damage. In turn, this could insu-
late it from accusations that it was continuing to manipulate its currency. 
Countries can remain EU member states in good standing and enjoy all the 
privileges associated with that status without adopting the euro. To be sure, 
most of the new members have not adopted the euro, because they do not 
yet meet the preconditions laid down by the Maastricht Treaty, where there 
is a presumption that this status is purely transitional. The United Kingdom, 
for its part, negotiated a derogation permitting it to remain outside the ERM 
and to retain sterling indeﬁ  nitely as a condition for agreeing to the Maas-
15. More on which is discussed later.
16. Or, who knows—they could also adopt a two-  pillar strategy targeting inﬂ  ation and a 
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tricht Treaty. An Italy or Portugal that abandoned the euro would enjoy 
no such derogation. Would it then have to joint the ERM-  II? But Sweden, 
alluding to the British precedent, announced unilaterally that it would not 
enter the ERM or follow a ﬁ  xed schedule for adopting the euro. Is it clear 
that a Sweden that never entered the euro area should be treated diﬀerently, 
in terms of its access to the single market, than an Italy that left it?
1.4      Political Barriers to Exit
More generally, a country that abandoned the euro and reintroduced its 
national currency because of problems of inadequate international competi-
tiveness, high unemployment, and slow growth might suﬀer political costs 
by being relegated to second-  class status in negotiations over other issues. 
One interpretation of the process of monetary integration that culminated 
in the advent of the euro is that monetary integration is a stepping stone 
to political integration, which is the ultimate goal of the architects of the 
European Union. As the point was once put by Jacques Delors, “Obsession 
about budgetary constraints means that the people forget too often about 
the political objectives of European construction. The argument in favor of 
the single currency should be based on the desire to live together in peace.”17 
Like the European Union’s blue ﬂ  ag with twelve yellow stars, the single 
currency is a visible symbol that fosters a sense of Europeanness among 
the continent’s residents. As suggested by the theory of neofunctionalist 
spillovers (Haas 1958), the existence of the euro and the European Central 
Bank generates pressure for a more powerful European Parliament to hold 
the ECB democratically accountable for its actions.18 A country that unilat-
erally abandons the euro, something for which there is no provision in the 
Treaty on European Union, would deal a setback to these larger political 
ambitions. It would signal that it did not attach high value to the larger pro-
cess of political integration.
On both grounds, such a country would be unlikely to be regarded as a 
respected interlocutor in discussions of how to push the process forward. An 
Italy that abandoned the euro would have a diminished role in discussions 
of how to strengthen the powers of the European Parliament. It would have 
less sway in discussions of how to revise and ratify the European constitu-
tion. Other member states would be less likely to grant it a seat at the table 
in discussions of whether to formulate a common foreign policy or to create 
a European army. For better or worse, the common European position on 
such issues has grown out of discussions among a core of countries centered 
on France and Germany that ﬁ  rst develop a common position and then 
sell it to the other members. For a country like Italy that has participated 
17. Cited in Prior-  Wandesforde and Hacche (2005, 23).
18. See section 1.5.20    Barry  Eichengreen
in this larger process of European integration from the foundation of the 
European Economic Community half a century ago, precisely as a way of 
elevating itself to the status of a ﬁ  rst-  tier European country, these political 
costs would be substantial. In turn, this constitutes a major barrier to exit.
What about Germany? If Germany abandoned the euro out of dissatis-
faction with excessively inﬂ  ationary ECB policies, this would signiﬁ  cantly 
diminish the prospects for political integration. Germany would be indicat-
ing that it regarded the experiment with a supranational institution with real 
powers—in this case, the power to make monetary policy—as a failure. The 
idea that Germany would then cede to other supranational institutions at 
the EU level the power to make its security policy, its foreign policy, or its 
ﬁ  scal policy, these being three of the key prerogatives of a sovereign state, 
would become less plausible. Germany has always been a strong proponent 
of the larger European project. Reﬂ  ecting memories of World War II, it 
continues to feel limits on its ability to formulate an assertive foreign policy, 
to maintain a standing army, and to deploy troops abroad; at a basic level, 
its interest in political integration is to regain a foreign policy voice in the 
context of an EU foreign policy. And without German support, European 
political integration is unlikely to display the same momentum.
Given this, Germany will presumably attempt to ﬁ  x the problems it per-
ceives with the ECB in order to salvage its vision of political integration 
rather than concluding that further integration is infeasible and abandoning 
the euro—or at least it will invest more in seeking to ﬁ  x perceived problems 
than another member state with a weaker commitment to the larger Euro-
pean process. It will choose voice and loyalty over exit, complaining publicly 
about the inﬂ  ationary stance of ECB policy and lobbying to change it, pre-
cisely in order to demonstrate that supranational European institutions can 
work and that its integrationist vision is still viable. This is not to deny that 
there could come a point where the German government and its constituents 
conclude that voice and loyalty have failed. But this argument does suggest 
that Germany may be prepared to suﬀer with a monetary policy not to its 
liking and that it will work to change that policy, rather than abandoning 
the euro, for longer than other member states less committed to the larger 
process.
Not everyone will agree that a monetary union process that adds to 
momentum for political integration is desirable on these grounds. Some 
would argue that the European Union should concentrate on economic 
integration while shunning aspirations of political integration. For them, 
if a failure of monetary union means a failure of political union, then the 
latter is not a cost.19 But for inﬂ  uential political elites, political integration 
19. This is not to say that the opponents of political union necessarily see the failure of 
monetary union as desirable, as the latter may have other beneﬁ  ts, including the impetus it 
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remains a valued goal. For them, exits from the euro area that set back its 
progress would be a signiﬁ  cant cost.
1.5      Procedural Barriers to Exit
A ﬁ  nal set of barriers to exit are the technical and legal obstacles to rein-
troducing the national currency. Take the case where a country suﬀering 
from inadequate competitiveness and high unemployment reintroduces its 
national currency in order to depreciate it against the euro. It would be 
straightforward for it to pass a law stating that the state and other employ-
ers will henceforth pay workers and pensioners, say, in lira. With wages and 
other incomes redenominated into the national currency, it would become 
politically necessary to redenominate the mortgages and credit card debts of 
residents into the national currency as well; otherwise, currency depreciation 
would have adverse balance- sheet eﬀects for households, leading to ﬁ  nancial 
distress and bankruptcies. But with mortgages and other bank assets rede-
nominated, bank deposits and other bank balance-  sheet items would also 
have to be redenominated in order to avoid destabilizing the ﬁ  nancial sector. 
With government revenues redenominated into the national currency, not 
just public-  sector wages and pensions but also other government liabili-
ties—notably the public debt—would have to be redenominated to prevent 
balance- sheet  eﬀects from damaging the government’s ﬁ  nancial position.
The idea that redenomination has to be comprehensive to limit ﬁ  nancial 
distress is a lesson of Argentina’s exit from convertibility in 2001.20 It is also 
an implication of the literature on dollarization, where it is argued that 
partial dollarization creates scope for destabilizing balance-  sheet eﬀects. It 
is better either to be fully dollarized (or euroized, in the present example) 
or to dedollarize (or de-  euroize) by redenominating claims in the national 
currency (see, for example, Levy Yeyati and Ize [2005] and Levy Yeyati 
[2006]).21
20. Note that across-  the-  board redenomination, while insulating domestic banks from 
destabilizing balance-  sheet eﬀects, might create problems for foreign banks, which saw their 
euro-  denominated investments, say, in Italian government bonds redenominated into lira and 
then saw this currency depreciate against the euro. This is another reason why other euro area 
countries would not welcome exit by an incumbent seeking to restore competitiveness by rein-
troducing and depreciating its national currency.
21. Argentina’s experience also sheds light on another approach to exiting the euro area 
that has occasionally been proposed—namely, reintroducing the national unit as a parallel 
currency. Italy would not have to leave the euro area or eliminate its euro circulation in order 
to reintroduce the lira, according to this scheme; it could simply reissue the lira and allow it 
to circulate side by side, along with the euro. The Argentine provinces did something similar 
in 2001 when they experienced serious diﬃculties in ﬁ  nancing their current expenditures: they 
issued very short-  term notes that circulated as quasi currency (“Patacones,” in the case of the 
province of Buenos Aires). The problem with this approach is that absent trade restrictions, it 
will have no eﬀect on the prices of goods and services on local markets; it will simply drive out a 
corresponding number of euros via trade deﬁ  cits. This is what happened in Argentina: the more 
Patacones were issued, the more peso-  denominated bank deposits were liquidated. Similarly, 22    Barry  Eichengreen
Technically, nothing prevents the legislature from passing a law requiring 
banks, ﬁ  rms, households, and governments to redenominate their contracts 
in this manner. But in a democracy, this decision will require discussion. And 
for it to be executed smoothly, it will have to be accompanied by planning. 
Computers will have to be reprogrammed. Vending machines will have to be 
modiﬁ  ed. Payment machines will have to be serviced to prevent motorists 
from being trapped in subterranean parking garages. Notes and coins will 
have to be positioned around the country. One need only recall the planning 
that preceded the introduction of the physical euro in 2002.
The diﬀerence between the transition to the euro and the transition back 
to national currencies is that in the ﬁ  rst instance, there was little reason to 
expect subsequent changes in exchange rates and thus little incentive for cur-
rency speculation, while in the second case, such changes would be viewed as 
virtually inevitable. In 1998, the founding members of the euro area agreed 
to lock their exchange rates at the then-  prevailing levels at the beginning of 
1999. This precommitment eﬀectively ruled out eﬀorts to depress national 
currencies designed to steal a competitive advantage prior to the locking of 
parities in 1999. In contrast, if a participating member state now decided 
to leave the euro area, no such precommitment would be possible. Pressure 
from other member states would be ineﬀective, by deﬁ  nition. And the very 
motivation for leaving would presumably be to change the parity.
Market participants would be well aware of this fact. Households and 
ﬁ  rms anticipating that domestic deposits would be redenominated into lira, 
which would then lose value against the euro, would shift their deposits to 
other euro area banks. In the worst case, a system-  wide bank run could fol-
low. Investors anticipating that their claims on the Italian government would 
be redenominated into lira would presumably shift into claims on other euro 
area governments, leading to a bond market crisis. If the precipitating factor 
was parliamentary debate over abandoning the lira, it would be unlikely that 
the ECB would provide extensive lender-  of-  last-  resort support. And if the 
government was already in a tenuous ﬁ  scal position, it would not be able to 
borrow in order to bail out the banks and buy back its debt. This would be 
the mother of all ﬁ  nancial crises.
Presumably, the government would respond with a “corralito,” Argentine 
style, limiting bank withdrawals. It would suspend the operation of the bond 
market, although this might be of limited eﬀectiveness insofar as the same 
bonds and derivative instruments based on them are also traded on other 
national markets. But all this would almost certainly be costly in terms of 
the more lira are issued, the greater the extent to which they will dominate the domestic circu-
lation, until the point comes where only lira circulate domestically, and the parallel currency 
approach dissolves into the simple substitution of the domestic unit for the euro, after which 
exchange rate depreciation presumably follows. And seeing this outcome coming, holders of 
euro- denominated claims will ﬂ  ee Italian banks and markets in advance, precipitating the same 
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output and employment. It would be hard to keep production going while 
the ﬁ  nancial system was halted in its tracks; this is a clear lesson of Argen-
tina’s 2001/  2002 crisis.
When the ruble zone broke up in the 1990s and new national currencies 
were introduced, the successor states of the former Soviet Union were able 
to limit the destabilizing ﬁ  nancial consequences because their banking and 
ﬁ  nancial systems were not well articulated, so limits on deposit withdrawals 
and other forms of arbitrage were relatively eﬀective. They could limit the 
substitution of foreign for domestic assets by imposing or simply retaining 
exchange controls, an option that is not available to EU members with com-
mitments to the single market. They could seal their borders to provide time 
to stamp old currencies or swap old currencies for new ones. Firms did not 
have computerized ﬁ  nancial accounts and inventory-  management systems. 
Europe today is a more complicated place. All this means that the techni-
cal obstacles to exit may be greater than in the past. While these technical 
obstacles may be surmountable, they pose greater challenges than in earlier 
instances where monetary unions broke up.
The same lesson is evident in the breakup of the Czechoslovak monetary 
union in 1993.22 The Czechs and Slovaks agreed to political separation as of 
January 1, 1993, but initially kept their monetary union in place in order to 
minimize dislocations to trade and economic activity. It was clear from the 
start, however, that politicians in both countries were actively contemplat-
ing exit. The monetary arrangement signed in October 1992 establishing 
the Czech-  Slovak currency union in fact made provision for exit (unlike the 
Treaty on European Union). The union could be abandoned (equivalent to 
exit, given that there were only two participants) if a member ran an exces-
sive budget deﬁ  cit, if it suﬀered excessive reserve losses, if there were exces-
sive capital ﬂ  ows from one republic to the other, or if the monetary policy 
committee was deadlocked.23 Although the Czech and Slovak Republics ini-
tially agreed to maintain a common currency for a minimum of six months, 
the markets did not ﬁ  nd this agreement credible; they expected that the 
Slovak authorities would push for a much looser monetary policy and that 
their Czech counterparts would not accept the consequent high inﬂ  ation. 
The result was a ﬂ  ight of currency and deposits from Slovakia to the Czech 
Republic. Given their divergent preferences and the market’s lack of conﬁ  -
dence in the monetary union, the authorities decided in favor of monetary 
separation. The demise of the monetary union was announced on Febru-
ary 2, just ﬁ  ve weeks after it had commenced operation, and separate na-
tional currencies were quickly introduced. Czechoslovak banknotes were 
22. See Fidrmuc, Horvath, and Fidrmuc (1999).
23. Under the provisions of the agreement, the Czechoslovak central bank was dissolved and 
replaced by a Czech National Bank and a National Bank of Slovakia. The common monetary 
policy was made by simple majority vote of a six- member committee made up of the governors 
and two senior oﬃcials from the two banks.24    Barry  Eichengreen
stamped and then replaced with new national banknotes. During this period, 
no currency was allowed to be transferred or exported abroad.24
This case suggests that monetary separation is technically feasible under 
some circumstances. Some of the technical problems of introducing a na-
tional currency were solved by stretching out this process over time. Old 
Czechoslovak banknotes were stamped during the second week of February, 
but the process of introducing the new Czech and Slovak banknotes was 
ﬁ  nally completed in August. The problem of adjusting vending machines 
and parking garages was addressed by allowing old Czechoslovak coins to 
continue to circulate in both countries for up to six months.
But the circumstances that made this possible were quite diﬀerent from 
those in the euro area today. The commercial banking system was only just 
getting up and running in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The authori-
ties adopted elaborate clearing mechanisms to limit withdrawals from and 
strains on their respective banking systems. Trading of shares in then-
  Czechoslovak companies acquired as a result of the voucher privatization 
got underway only in May 1993—that is, three months after exit from the 
monetary union. Thus, there was limited scope for arbitrage between na-
tional banking systems and securities markets. There were few institutional 
investors in a position to shift large ﬁ  nancial balances from one successor 
state to the other.
Moreover, in the period leading up to the monetary separation, exten-
sive capital controls were already in place. These slowed capital ﬂ  ight from 
the Slovak Republic, in particular, where the new currency was expected to 
weaken, but they did not halt them. Payments between the two republics 
were halted completely at the beginning of February while the details of the 
separation were ironed out. This protected the banking system, especially in 
the Slovak Republic, from capital ﬂ  ight.
Finally, the fact that the old Czechoslovak currency disappeared at the 
end of the six- month transition eased the process of dissolving the currency 
union. In the case of an individual member exiting from the euro area, in 
contrast, the euro would continue to circulate in the rump euro zone (whose 
size would presumably be considerable). Were Italy, for example, to exit 
the euro area, stamp the euro area banknotes of residents or replace them 
with new Italian banknotes, and impose restrictions on capital ﬂ  ows for the 
period of the currency exchange, Italian residents would be able to simply 
hold onto their euro cash and coins and then export them once the restric-
tions were lifted. This would make operations designed to exchange Italian 
residents’ euro banknotes for the new national currency—as opposed to 
injecting new national currency notes in addition to existing euro bank-
notes—considerably more diﬃcult.
24. Although there was apparently some movement of unstamped banknotes from Slovakia 
to the Czech Republic during the period when stamping took place, because borders were not 
sealed to individual foreign travel.The Breakup of the Euro Area    2 5
The need for extraordinary measures is also the clear lesson of the breakup 
of earlier monetary unions, such as that of the successor states to the Austro-
 Hungarian  Empire.25 Austria, Hungary, and the other ethnic regions of 
the empire all successfully introduced national currencies following World 
War I. Previously, they had operated a formal monetary union, with con-
trol of the circulation vested in the Austro-  Hungarian bank in Vienna. The 
component parts of the empire constituted a free-  trade zone, and both real 
and ﬁ  nancial integration were extensive. At the same time, like EMU today, 
the constituent states (Austria and Hungary) decided on separate budgets 
while contributing to some of the expenditures of the union.
Ethnic demands for autonomy boiled up during World War I. Vienna, 
occupied elsewhere, lost the capacity to assert its control over non- Austrian 
parts of the empire. Other regions held back food supplies, disrupting the 
operation of the internal market. Czechs and other ethnic groups withdrew 
from the military alliance, siding with the Allies. With the armistice, the 
Czechs, Poles, and Hungarians declared their political independence and 
sought to establish and defend their national borders. They also abandoned 
prior restraints on their ﬁ  scal policies, partly owing to postwar exigencies 
and partly in reﬂ  ection of the value they now attached to political sover-
eignty. Importantly, however, the Austrian crown remained the basis for 
the monetary circulation throughout the former empire. This was awkward 
for separate sovereign nations that did not share in the seignorage and that 
experienced asymmetric shocks and suﬀered from chronic ﬁ  scal and ﬁ  nan-
cial imbalances.
Starting with Czechoslovakia and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and 
  Slovenes (Yugoslavia), one successor state after another left the monetary 
union and introduced a national currency. Typically, this involved ﬁ  rst 
announcing that only stamped Austrian banknotes would be acceptable in 
transactions. Stamping (either overprinting with an ink stamp or adding a 
physical stamp) had to be conducted carefully, with a high level of unifor-
mity, to discourage forgery. At the same time the currency was stamped, a 
portion was withheld as a capital levy (as a way of transferring desperately 
needed resources to the government). In Hungary, for example, 50 percent 
of tendered notes were withheld as a forced loan. In Czechoslovakia, the 50 
percent tax was applied to current accounts and treasury bills when these 
were redenominated in stamped crowns. In turn, this created an incentive 
to withhold currency from circulation if there were prospects of using it in 
other countries where stamping had not yet taken place. Thus, there was an 
incentive for capital ﬂ  ight not unlike that which might aﬄict an inﬂ  ation-
  prone country today that chose to opt out of Europe’s monetary union.
Stamping was therefore accompanied by the physical closing of the coun-
try’s borders and the imposition of comprehensive exchange controls. Indi-
viduals were prohibited from traveling abroad, and merchandise trade was 
25. See also Dornbusch (1992) and Eichengreen (2007).26    Barry  Eichengreen
halted. The capital levy, equivalent to depreciation of the new currency 
against the old one, could also precipitate a run on the banks, as it did in 
Czechoslovakia. In Austria, which could observe Czechoslovakia’s earlier 
experience, bank securities and deposits were frozen at the outset of the 
transition. Again, avoiding serious ﬁ  nancial dislocations required closing 
the borders, banning foreign travel, halting merchandise trade, and impos-
ing draconian exchange controls while the conversion was underway. The 
feasibility of similar measures today is dubious.
Finally, what about a country, say, Germany, that might wish to leave the 
euro area because other governments had successfully pressured the ECB 
to run inﬂ  ationary policies? The procedural diﬃculties in this case would 
be less. Here, the expectation would be that the deutschemark, once reintro-
duced, would appreciate against the euro. There would be no incentive to ﬂ  ee 
German banks and ﬁ  nancial markets but rather an incentive to rush in, given 
this one- way bet on appreciation. The challenge for Germany would thus be 
massive capital inﬂ  ows in the period when exit from the euro area was being 
discussed. The result would be inﬂ  ation, a booming stock market, and soar-
ing housing prices.26 Soaring asset valuations are less uncomfortable than 
collapsing ones, but the ﬁ  nancial dislocations would still be considerable.
These uncomfortable ﬁ  nancial consequences would in turn constitute a 
disincentive to contemplate exiting. Germany faced similar problems in the 
1960s, when it was widely anticipated that the deutschemark would be reval-
ued against the dollar. But at that point in time, it was able to impose capital 
controls to limit inﬂ  ows. Germany reimposed controls in 1960 to 1961, the 
period prior to the ﬁ  rst revaluation of its currency. In mid- 1970, the country 
then imposed discriminatory minimum reserve requirements against non-
resident bank deposits and from May 1971 required prior authorization 
for the sale of money-  market paper and certain ﬁ  xed-  interest securities to 
foreigners. Similar responses would be diﬃcult in the context of the single 
market (assuming, as seems plausible, that Germany would still wish to 
preserve its single market obligations).27
26. The symmetry between buying and selling attacks on currencies is the subject of Grilli 
(1986).
27. The closest precedent for exit by a strong-  currency country of which I am aware was 
the possibility that Luxembourg might exit from its monetary union with Belgium in 1993. 
The European Monetary System (EMS) crisis of that year had led to currency devaluation 
by a number of participating countries, and in the summer, Germany and the Netherlands 
considered the possibility of unilaterally exiting from the ERM rather than facing pressure 
to inﬂ  ate along with Belgium, France, and the others. At this point, the authorities in Lux-
embourg evidently contemplated following the deutchemark and the guilder rather than the 
two francs, which would have required them to break their monetary union with Belgium. In 
fact, Luxembourg had established a protocentral bank (the Luxembourg Monetary Institute) 
a decade earlier, in 1983, when the Belgians had unilaterally realigned without engaging in 
prior consultations with their monetary union partner. (Ironically, the prime minister of Lux-
embourg at the time was Pierre Werner, commonly regarded as one of the fathers of the euro.) 
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This case can, in fact, be argued both ways on procedural grounds. It can 
be argued that Germany could insulate its economy from the impact of the 
capital inﬂ  ows loosed by its reintroduction of the deutschemark, because 
German interest rates would be lower than foreign interest rates, and the 
risk premia associated with investing in Germany would be lower as well. 
Thus, the Bundesbank would be able to sterilize the inﬂ  ows associated with 
its reintroduction of the national currency.
Goodhart (2008)—in a note written partly in response to the present 
chapter—questions the relevance of this German exit scenario. He observes 
that the ECB enjoys statutory independence. It has a mandate to pursue 
price stability. Its board is made up of professional central bankers who 
have internalized arguments for the value of low inﬂ  ation. Changing the 
status quo and exposing the ECB to eﬀective political pressure would require 
amending the international treaty that established the ECB and the euro—
something that Germany could veto. European politicians can posture all 
they want. They can take whatever measures they wish to elevate the visibil-
ity of the Eurogroup of ﬁ  nance ministers. But their statements and actions 
are unlikely to weaken the ECB’s commitment to price stability. And if 
Goodhart is right, the German exit scenario has a vanishingly small prob-
ability.
1.6      Legal Barriers to Exit
Even if there is agreement that the transition would be smoothed by 
redenominating all Italian debt contracts into lira, there is the question of 
what exactly constitutes an Italian debt contract. Not all such contracts are 
between Italian debtors and Italian creditors, are issued in Italy, and spec-
ify Italian courts for adjudicating disputes. Italian companies issue bonds 
abroad and borrow from foreign banks. Foreign multinationals sell bonds in 
Italy. Foreigners hold the bonds of Italian governments. A further complica-
tion is that contracts are not simply being redenominated from one Italian 
currency to another; rather, they are being redenominated from a European 
currency to an Italian currency. Foreign courts might therefore take EU law 
as the law of the currency issuer (Italy) and invalidate the redenomination 
of certain contracts.
Mann (1960) argues that when a case involves two competing currencies, 
the courts should apply the law speciﬁ  ed in the contract. For instruments 
for the contingency that it might have to exit from its monetary union with Belgium. (See for-
mer prime minister Juncker’s interview with Agence Presse France, summarized at: http:/ / news
.bbc.co.uk/  2/  hi/  business/  1677037.stm.) The implications for the present argument are unclear, 
because Belgium ultimately did not devalue against the guilder and the deutschemark in 1993. 
Whether Luxembourg, with its open-  capital markets and highly developed ﬁ  nancial system, 
in fact could have smoothly broken its monetary link with Belgium is at a minimum an open 
question. What is revealing, however, is that Luxembourg chose to destroy its stock of national 
notes and coins in 2002 when the physical euro came into existence.28    Barry  Eichengreen
such as Italian government bonds issued domestically, this is Italian law. But 
foreign laws govern a variety of other Italian ﬁ  nancial instruments, such as 
corporate bonds issued abroad. And in some cases, no explicit choice of law 
is speciﬁ  ed in the contract. For example, this is the case for loans by German 
banks to Italian corporations or for purchases of parts in Germany by Ital-
ian manufacturing ﬁ  rms. Italian courts would presumably rule in favor of 
the redenomination of all loans to Italian borrowers, including those from 
German banks, but German courts might rule against redenomination. And 
there are few precedents to guide the courts’ decision in such circumstances.28 
This opens the door to litigation and to an extended period of uncertainty.
Still, Argentina’s dealings with its creditors suggest that the government 
of a country altering its currency arrangements is in a relatively strong posi-
tion. While that case also gave rise to litigation in a variety of venues, it did 
not force the redollarization of previously pesiﬁ  ed contracts or force other 
compensation to aggrieved creditors. But cases involving suits against Ital-
ian debtors in the courts of other European countries and in the European 
Court of Justice could be messier. And the Italian government would be 
loath to disregard their judgments insofar as it attached value to the coun-
try’s other links with the European Union.
1.7    Evidence
Since 2002, the Eurobarometer has conducted annual surveys of public 
opinion regarding the euro in the participating member states. Here, I ana-
lyze answers to the following question: “In your opinion, for [COUNTRY], 
is the adoption of the euro advantageous overall and will it strengthen us for 
the future, or rather the opposite, disadvantageous overall and will it weaken 
us?” Figure 1.1 shows the pattern of responses from the most recent survey at 
the time of writing. Evidently, the euro is least popular, as measured here, in 
low- income euro area member states (Greece, Portugal) and in slowly grow-
ing economies (Italy and again Portugal) but also in the Netherlands (where 
concerns are disproportionately over inﬂ  ation—see ﬁ  gure 1.2).
Table 1.1 shows regressions of the share of the population, by country 
and year, that views the euro as disadvantageous. The dependent variable, 
a logit transformation of this share, is regressed on inﬂ  ation and growth 
in the current year.29 The results are consistent with the notion that higher 
28. Technically, the country in which delivery is physically taken (where the transaction is 
physically completed) should be the one whose law governs international contracts. In the 
present instance, this would be German law if the Italian company’s truck drives to Stuttgart 
to pick up parts at the German factory, but it would be Italian law if the German company’s 
truck is used to transport the parts to the Italian assembly plant.
29. One can imagine more sophisticated speciﬁ  cations, but the limited amount of data avail-
able do not really permit their estimation.Fig. 1.1    Public opinion by country
Fig. 1.2    Survey responses in the Netherlands30    Barry  Eichengreen
inﬂ  ation raises dissatisfaction with the euro, while higher growth reduces 
dissatisfaction. In the basic regression on pooled data, in column (1), the 
growth term is statistically signiﬁ  cant at conventional levels, while the inﬂ  a-
tion term is not quite signiﬁ  cant. When year eﬀects are added in column (2), 
the coeﬃcients on both the inﬂ  ation and growth terms diﬀer signiﬁ  cantly 
from 0 at standard conﬁ  dence levels. When we estimate the same equation 
with random country eﬀects in column (3), it is the inﬂ  ation term but not 
the growth term that is statistically signiﬁ  cant.
Thus, while there are not enough data to obtain precise point estimates, 
there are indications that slow growth and high inﬂ  ation could fan dissatis-
faction with membership in the euro area.30
The second empirical exercise has in fact been undertaken by Hallerberg 
and Wolﬀ (2006), although they do not draw out the implications for exit 
from the euro area. They test whether both membership in the monetary 
union and ﬁ  scal reforms that reduce deﬁ  cit bias have a negative impact on 
sovereign borrowing costs. Thus, they speak at least obliquely to the hypoth-
esis that a country could minimize any adverse impact on debt-  servicing 
costs of abandoning the euro by strengthening its ﬁ  scal institutions. They 
Table 1.1  Determinants of negative opinions of the euro, 2002 to 2006 (standard 
errors in parentheses)
  Variable   (1)   (2)   (3)  
Inﬂ  ation 0.005 0.007a 0.004a
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)











Observations 60 60 60
  Random eﬀects   N   N   Y  
Source: Eurobarometer and author’s own calculations.
Note: Constant term estimated but not reported.
aSigniﬁ  cant at the 95 percent level.
30. It is also possible to analyze the individual survey responses in order to see how senti-
ment toward the euro varies with education, gender, urbanization, and so forth. See Jonung 
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estimate panel regressions with country ﬁ  xed eﬀects for ten EU member 
states, where the dependent variable is the yield on ten-  year government 
bond rates relative to the corresponding German yield, and the period cov-
ered is 1993 to 2005. This spread is regressed on the diﬀerence in the budget 
deﬁ  cit between country i and Germany and the diﬀerence in the public 
debt/  GDP ratio between country i and Germany. Control variables include 
a measure of market liquidity and a measure of global risk aversion. The 
key explanatory variables are then dummy variables for membership in the 
euro area and for the strength of ﬁ  scal institutions, which are entered by 
themselves and interacted with the deﬁ  cit measure.31
The authors follow Von Hagen (1992) in arguing that deﬁ  cit bias reﬂ  ects 
a common-  pool problem: special interests beneﬁ  ting from additional pub-
lic spending fail to internalize the implications for the deﬁ  cit and there-
fore for the government’s borrowing costs. They argue that this bias can be 
minimized by assigning authority over the budget to a single individual, the 
ﬁ  nance minister, who will have a greater tendency to internalize such eﬀects. 
They operationalize this idea by constructing an index measuring the ability 
of the ﬁ  nance minister to aﬀect the budget. They also consider a survey-
  based measure of the structure of the budget process and a synthetic mea-
sure that relies not on delegation but on ﬁ  scal targets for countries where the 
ideological distance between coalition partners is large and therefore where 
delegation is unlikely to be eﬀective.32 Results are similar for the alternative 
measures, so I discuss the most straightforward ones—those for delegation 
of authority to the ﬁ  nance minister—here.
Higher debts and deﬁ  cits increase spreads, although the eﬀects are small. 
The eﬀect of EMU is also evident: an increase in the deﬁ  cit by 1 percent of 
GDP raises the spread by 4 basis points for a noneuro area country but only 
by 1.5 percent for a euro area member. An increase in the ﬁ  nance minister’s 
powers from Portuguese to Austrian levels reduces the spread by 2 to 4 basis 
points; it also reduces the impact of an increase in the deﬁ  cit by 1 percent 
of GDP by 2 basis points. These results are consistent with the hypothesis 
that EMU and strengthened budgetary procedures are alternative ways of 
strengthening ﬁ  scal discipline.33 They suggest that countries exiting the mon-
etary union can avoid higher interest costs if they put in place eﬃcient bud-
31. In addition, the EMU variable is interacted with the measure of market liquidity and 
with the debt ratio.
32. In addition, they consider a measure of the degree of the legislature or the parliament 
over the budget (Lienert’s [2005] parliamentary index). However, it is possible to raise questions 
about the relevance of this particular measure to the issues at hand. Hence, I do not consider 
it further in what follows.
33. The assumption underlying this interpretation is that the smaller impact of deﬁ  cits on 
spreads in euro area countries reﬂ  ects the disciplining eﬀect of the monetary union—that deﬁ  -
cits will not persist or that larger deﬁ  cits now will be followed by smaller deﬁ  cits later—rather 
than assuming myopia on the part of governments or that the latter will receive a debt bailout 
from their partners in the event of ﬁ  scal diﬃculties.32    Barry  Eichengreen
getary procedures that mitigate common-  pool problems. At the same time, 
the size of the eﬀects is small. Just 4.5 additional basis points for a euro area 
country whose deﬁ  cit grows from 0 to 3 percent of GDP makes one wonder 
whether these estimates are picking up the full eﬀect or if something else is 
going on. One explanation for why economic policies and institutions do 
not have a larger impact on spreads is that the ECB carries out open market 
operations in the bonds of all its members, regardless of the strength of 
their policies and institutions; this does not force spreads to equality but 
may limit diﬀerentials.34
I further investigated the robustness of these results by analyzing the 
impact of EMU and ﬁ  scal institutions on sovereign credit ratings. This 
involves analyzing their impact on three credit rating measures: Fitch’s, 
Standard and Poor’s, and an average of the two rating agencies. In the inter-
est of space, here I report the results using the average of the two ratings 
as the dependent variable.35 The country sample and period are essentially 
the same as in the Hallerberg and Wolﬀ study, as the analysis is constrained 
by the availability of their indices of ﬁ  scal measures. One diﬀerence here 
is the use of quarterly data: the ﬁ  scal measures are available at a quarterly 
frequency, and the credit ratings can be sampled at the end of each quarter. 
Another diﬀerence is that I look at the absolute level of credit ratings, not 
ratings (or spreads) relative to Germany (and not the strength of ﬁ  scal insti-
tutions relative to Germany).36
I start with a simple panel regression of the credit rating(s) on the measure 
of ﬁ  scal institutions (in column [1] of each table). Year ﬁ  xed eﬀects are then 
added (column [2]), and if these are jointly signiﬁ  cant, they are then included 
in the remaining regressions. Column (3) adds country eﬀects (using the 
Hausman test to choose between ﬁ  xed and random eﬀects). Column (4) 
adds the entire vector of macroeconomic and ﬁ  nancial variables. The empiri-
cal speciﬁ  cation follows Christensen and Solomonsen (2007), who estimate 
empirical models of credit ratings; the main diﬀerence here is the addition 
of interaction eﬀects for euro area countries, plus the use of total debt rather 
than public debt (following Hallerberg and Wolﬀ [2006]). Finally, I incorpo-
rate improvements in the measures of ﬁ  scal arrangements developed by the 
authors since the appearance of their earlier working paper.37 Speciﬁ  cally, 
34. More precisely, the ECB assigns the short-  term sovereign debt instruments of all euro 
area member governments to the same (highest) liquidity category, implying the lowest haircut 
when accepting them as collateral. Because the ECB mainly accepts short-  term instruments 
in its market operations, it is these on which spreads should show the strongest tendency to 
converge. Spreads on the longer- term instruments considered by Hallerberg and Wolﬀ are then 
freer to vary, although they will still be aﬀected by the term-  structure relationship. See Buiter 
and Sibert (2005).
35. The additional results for Fitch and S&P separately are available on request. The Fitch and 
S&P letter scores are both converted to a numerical score ranging from one to twenty-  one.
36. As a result, I have an additional set of country observations for Germany itself.
37. And that were kindly made available by Mark Hallerberg.The Breakup of the Euro Area    3 3
I employ three measures of ﬁ  scal arrangements: “Strong ﬁ  nance minister” 
(a measure of the power of the ﬁ  nance minister during budget negotia-
tions in the cabinet and with Parliament), “Index S2” (the authors’ synthetic 
measure that relies not on delegation to a strong ﬁ  nance minister but on 
ﬁ  scal targets for countries where the ideological distance between coalition 
partners is large), and “Fiscgov” (the authors’ survey-  based measure of the 
degree of centralization of the budgetary process). All three measures are 
scaled so as to vary from 0 to 1, with larger values indicating arrangements 
better suited for resolving common-  pool problems.
The results found in tables 1.2 through 1.4 are broadly consistent with 
those using spreads as the dependent variable.38 All three measures of the 
centralization of ﬁ  scal policymaking are positively associated with the rat-
ing agencies’ measures of credit quality. This remains the case, except for 
Index S2, when a wide range of controls are included in the estimating equa-
tion. Macroeconomic and ﬁ  nancial conditions generally aﬀect ratings in the 
expected direction, although their eﬀects are not always signiﬁ  cant at con-
ventional conﬁ  dence levels. Inﬂ  ation, unemployment, large current account 
deﬁ  cits, and high debts lower ratings. So far, so good.
Evidence on whether adopting the euro attenuates the impact of macro-
economic and ﬁ  nancial imbalances on credit ratings is mixed. Consistent 
with the hypothesis, the negative eﬀects of inﬂ  ation and unemployment on 
credit ratings are attenuated by participation in the monetary union. Coun-
tries with large current account deﬁ  cits suﬀer less in terms of credit rating 
if they are members of the monetary union. The one uncomfortable result 
is that the interaction of the EMU dummy with the debt ratio (general 
government-  consolidated gross debt as a percentage of GDP) is negative, 
not positive as anticipated under the maintained hypothesis. This coeﬃcient 
is 0 in the ﬁ  nal column, where the lagged dependent variable is included (as 
seems to be preferred by the data), which makes the result somewhat less 
perplexing. Sensitivity analysis—dropping countries one by one—reveals 
that these anomalous results are driven by Belgium. Without the observa-
tions for this one country, one obtains a negative and signiﬁ  cant coeﬃcient 
on the debt/  GDP ratio and a smaller positive and signiﬁ  cant coeﬃcient on 
the debt/  GDP ratio interacted with EMU. This is not entirely surprising in 
that Belgium has long had a relatively high credit rating, despite its very high 
government debt, for reasons that are not entirely clear.
One interpretation of these results is that any increase in debt-  servicing 
costs experienced by a country like Portugal that is abandoning the euro can 
be neutralized by reforming ﬁ  scal institutions to delegate more authority to 
38. I adopt the same variable names as Hallerberg and Wolﬀ for ease of comparison, except 
that I refer to the squared deviation of real GDP per capita from trend as “trend deviation” 
(or simply “deviation”) as opposed to “sustainability” to avoid confusion with debt sustain-
ability.Table 1.2  Eﬀect of EMU and ﬁ  scal institutions on credit ratings (Strong ﬁ  nance minister 
measure of ﬁ  scal institutions)
    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)
Strong Finance  2.5358 2.3411 2.6822 0.8813 0.1640
 Minister (0.474)∗∗∗ (0.520)∗∗∗ (0.187)∗∗∗ (0.244)∗∗∗ (0.079)∗∗
Real GDP per  –0.00005 –0.00002
 capita (0.00002)∗∗ (7.97 ∗ 10^–6)∗
Trend deviation 1.50 ∗ 10^–10 3.81 ∗ 10^–10
(1.09 ∗ 10^–9) (3.46 ∗ 10^–10)
Debt (% of GDP) –0.0235 –0.0042
(0.0105) (0.0034)
Inﬂ  ation –0.3068 –0.0368
(0.0372)∗∗∗ (0.0136)∗∗∗
Unemployment –0.0227 –0.0066
 rate (0.0156) (0.0049)
Export growth  –0.0215 –0.0017
  (year to year) (0.0064)∗∗∗ (0.0020)
Current account  0.0379 0.0277
 deﬁ  cit  4% (0.127) (0.040)
EMU –0.7083 –0.1579
(0.2598)∗∗∗ (0.0833)∗
Real GDP per  0.00004 0.00001
 capita  ∗ EMU (0.00003)∗ (8.32 ∗ 10^–6)∗
Trend deviation   –1.50 ∗ 10^–10 –3.96 ∗ 10^–10
  ∗ EMU (1.10 ∗ 10^–9) (3.49 ∗ 10^–10)
Debt (% of GDP)   –0.0148 –0.0006
  ∗ EMU (0.0053)∗∗∗ (0.0017)
Inﬂ  ation ∗ EMU 0.4160 0.0379
(0.048)∗∗∗ (0.017)∗∗
Unemployment 0.0340 0.0065
  ∗ EMU (0.013)∗∗∗ (0.004)
Export growth  0.0156 –0.0017
 ∗  EMU (0.0083)∗ (0.0026)
Current account  –0.2702 –0.0433





Constant 17.964 17.941 17.871 20.813 1.8503
(0.316)∗∗∗ (0.504)∗∗∗ (0.122)∗∗∗ (0.378)∗∗∗ (0.332)∗∗∗
Year ﬁ  xed eﬀects No Yes No No No
Country ﬁ  xed eﬀects No No Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗
N 462 462 462 462 451
R2   0.0587   0.0587   0.0587   0.4863   0.9949
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.Table 1.3  Eﬀect of EMU and ﬁ  scal institutions on credit ratings (Index S2 of ﬁ  scal 
institutions)
    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)
Index S2 2.5638 2.1848 3.3274 0.4829 0.1317
(0.619)∗∗∗ (0.659)∗∗∗ (0.272)∗∗∗ (0.328) (0.106)
Real GDP per capita –0.00006 –0.00002
(0.00003)∗∗ (8.04 ∗ 10^–6)∗∗
Trend deviation 2.16 ∗ 10^–10 3.99 ∗ 10^–10
(1.11 ∗ 10^–9) (3.48 ∗ 10^–10)
Debt (% of GDP) –0.0231 –0.0040
(0.0107)∗∗ (0.0033)
Inﬂ  ation –0.3633 –0.0434
(0.0364)∗∗∗ (0.0137)∗∗∗
Unemployment rate –0.0147 –0.0054
(0.0156) (0.0049)
Export growth (year  –0.0228 –0.0017
 to  year) (0.0065)∗∗∗ (0.0021)
Current account  0.0786 0.0352
 deﬁ  cit  4% (0.128) (0.0398)
EMU –0.7523 –0.1577
(0.2664)∗∗∗ (0.0849)∗
Real GDP per capita  0.0001 0.00002
 ∗  EMU (0.00002)∗∗ (8.38 ∗ 10^–6)∗
Trend deviation ∗ –2.53  ∗ 10^–10 –4.12 ∗ 10^–10
 EMU (1.12  ∗ 10^–9) (3.51 ∗ 10^–8)
Debt (% of GDP) ∗ –0.0155 –0.0008
 EMU (0.0054)∗∗∗ (0.0017)
Inﬂ  ation ∗ EMU 0.4668 0.0436
(0.0480)∗∗∗ (0.0171)∗∗
Unemployment ∗ 0.0318 0.0062
 EMU (0.013)∗∗ (0.004)
Export growth ∗ 0.0175 –0.0015
 EMU (0.0084)∗∗ (0.0026)
Current account  –0.2826 –0.0455
 deﬁ  cit ∗ EMU (0.1237)∗∗ (0.0388)
Lagged dependent  0.9213
 variable (0.015)∗∗∗
Constant 18.071 18.028 17.622 21.120 1.8080
(0.376)∗∗∗ (0.546)∗∗∗ (0.163)∗∗∗ (0.419)∗∗∗ (0.340)∗∗∗
Year ﬁ  xed eﬀects No Yes No No No
Country ﬁ  xed eﬀects No No Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗
N 462 462 462 424 414
R2   0.0360   0.0360   0.0360   0.4651   0.9950
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.Table 1.4  Eﬀect of EMU and ﬁ  scal institutions on credit ratings (Fiscgov measure of ﬁ  scal 
institutions)
    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)
Fiscgov 4.7004 4.5864 4.2989 2.2219 0.2477
(0.518)∗∗∗ (0.531)∗∗∗ (0.306)∗∗∗ (0.340)∗∗∗ (0.115)∗∗
Real GDP per capita –0.00004 –0.00002
(0.00002) (7.92 ∗ 10^–6)∗∗
Trend deviation –3.57 ∗ 10^–10 3.50 ∗ 10^–10
(1.06 ∗ 10^–9) (3.47 ∗ 10^–10)
Debt (% of GDP) –0.0183 –0.0038
(0.0102) (0.0034)
Inﬂ  ation –0.2533 –0.0400
(0.0345)∗∗∗ (0.0126)∗∗∗
Unemployment rate –0.0327 –0.0070
(0.0151)∗∗ (0.0049)
Export growth (year  –0.0213 –0.0019
 to  year) (0.0062)∗∗∗ (0.0020)
Current account   0.0219 0.0297
 deﬁ  cit  4% (0.122) (0.0398)
EMU –0.6714 –0.1677
(0.2507)∗∗∗ (0.0828)∗∗
Real GDP per capita  0.00003 0.00001
  ∗ EMU (0.00003) (8.30 ∗ 10^–6)∗
Trend deviation  3.17 ∗ 10^–10 –3.69 ∗ 10^–10
  ∗ EMU (1.07 ∗ 10^–9) (3.50 ∗ 10^–10)
Debt (% of GDP) ∗ –0.0128 –0.0004
 EMU (0.0051)∗∗ (0.0017)
Inﬂ  ation ∗ EMU 0.3691 0.0416
(0.046)∗∗∗ (0.017)∗∗∗
Unemployment 0.0423 0.0071
  ∗ EMU (0.013)∗∗∗ (0.0041)∗
Export growth  0.0142 –0.0015
  ∗ EMU (0.008)∗ (0.0026)
Current account  –0.2616∗ –0.0445
 deﬁ  cit ∗ EMU (0.1184) (0.0387)
Lagged dependent  0.9133
 variable (0.015)∗∗∗
Constant 16.200 16.047 16.488 19.565 1.8667
(0.3842)∗∗∗ (0.540)∗∗∗ (0.222)∗∗∗ (0.434)∗∗∗ (0.331)∗∗∗
Year ﬁ  xed eﬀects No Yes No No No
Country ﬁ  xed eﬀects No No Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗
N 462 462 462 462 451
R2   0.1517   0.1517   0.1517   0.5196   0.9949
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.The Breakup of the Euro Area    3 7
the prime minister, by addressing concerns over the common- pool problem, 
and by reassuring investors that exit will not result in a loss of ﬁ  scal disci-
pline. The ﬁ  nancial disincentive may not, therefore, be an insurmountable 
obstacle to abandoning the euro.
One reason for questioning these results is that the impact of debts and 
deﬁ  cits—euro adoption and ﬁ  scal institutions notwithstanding—are sus-
piciously small in these regressions, as in the earlier work of Hallerberg 
and Wolﬀ on interest rate spreads.39 One worries that for whatever reason, 
these results are not picking up the entire eﬀect of ﬁ  scal conditions, current 
and prospective, on credit ratings. But the fact that the rating agencies do 
not dramatically diﬀerentiate between ﬁ  scally messy Belgium and Italy and 
ﬁ  scally responsible Finland and Ireland is widely commented on—just as 
it is noted that markets diﬀerentiate between them relatively little in terms 
of interest rate spreads. If there is an anomaly, in other words, it would 
appear to be in the behavior of investors and rating agencies rather than in 
the econometrics.
In addition, one worries that ratings fail to reﬂ  ect diﬀerences in current 
ﬁ  scal conditions among euro area countries, not because the euro represents 
a commitment to get one’s ﬁ  scal house together in the not- too- distant future, 
but rather because ﬁ  scally proﬂ  igate governments can expect a debt bailout 
from their euro area partners. At the same time, the prospects for a bailout 
can be questioned. And even if the mechanism making for rosier future pros-
pects is a bailout rather than ﬁ  scal reform, this does not change the argument 
that a potential beneﬁ  t of euro area membership is an easier ﬁ  scal ride. One 
worries that in a more turbulent environment (out of sample), the results 
might diﬀer—although it is not entirely clear why the Lucas critique would 
apply in this context. Finally, to the extent that ﬁ  scal rules are endogenous 
(to the extent that they reﬂ  ect the same political pressures that lead to large 
observed deﬁ  cits), it may be naive to think that a country abandoning the 
euro because of chronic deﬁ  cit problems will then be able to turn around 
and strengthen its policy-  making institutions. That said, it is interesting to 
observe that Italy succeeded in signiﬁ  cantly strengthening the ability of the 
ﬁ  nance minister to aﬀect the budget following the 1992 crisis that ejected it 
from the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary System and 
presumably weakened the disciplining eﬀect of EMU on its budget.40
Finally, it is possible to compare these results with Standard & Poor’s 
own exercise (S&P; 2005). Standard & Poor’s considered the impact of a 
country leaving the euro area in 2006 using its own proprietary model (which 
39. Thus, an increase in the debt ratio from 50 to 100 percent of GDP is expected to lower a 
country’s credit rating by just one notch, say, from A to–  A. This small eﬀect is a widely com-
mented-  on phenomenon (see, for example, Buiter and Sibert [2005]), although here it applies 
not just to euro area but also to noneuro area countries.
40. The same was true, inter alia, of Spain and Finland, according to the indices of Haller-
berg and Wolﬀ (2006).38    Barry  Eichengreen
similarly regresses ratings on a range of indicators intended to capture po-
litical, economic, and ﬁ  nancial conditions). It was assumed that a country 
leaving the euro area was able to successfully depreciate the real exchange 
rate, restoring it to the average level prevailing in the 1990s—something 
that had the eﬀect of improving ratings, other things equal. But it was also 
assumed that interest rates on government debt rose by 100 basis points. 
Thus, the conclusion was that leaving the euro area would have relatively 
little eﬀect on ratings for lightly indebted countries that had suﬀered signiﬁ  -
cant deteriorations in competitiveness but would have a signiﬁ  cant negative 
eﬀect on heavily indebted members whose competitiveness losses had been 
limited (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Belgium). The main diﬀerence 
from the exercise in this chapter is that S&P assumed no further change in 
current or expected future ﬁ  scal policies and procedures. Its analysis does 
not contradict the point that signiﬁ  cant ﬁ  scal reform could oﬀset the impact 
on ratings of abandoning the euro; it simply does not consider the pos-
sibility.
1.8      Reforms to Avert a Breakup
If one wishes to minimize the likelihood of breakup, then what kind of 
reforms are needed? Here, there is no magic potion, only the standard mea-
sures pointed to by the literatures on optimum currency areas (OCA) and 
the democratic accountability of economic policymakers.41
Measures to further enhance labor mobility within the euro area are a 
ﬁ  rst set of reforms pointed to by OCA theory.42 Regulations to ensure that 
French ski resorts extend equality of treatment to instructors trained in 
other European countries—and more generally, the removal of residual 
barriers to the mutual recognition of technical credentials, the portabil-
ity of pensions, and the receipt of social services—will relieve the pressure 
that countries with depressed labor markets otherwise feel to do something, 
anything, including reintroducing the national currency, to address their 
unemployment problem. Concretely, the European Union has made some 
progress in the requisite direction, making qualiﬁ  cations more transpar-
ent and transferable by creating a standard portfolio of documents (the 
41. An earlier attempt to ask these same questions is found in Cohen (2000).
42. These are supplemented by measures to enhance the ﬂ  exibility of real and nominal wages. 
The ECB (2007) argues that real wages remain less ﬂ  exible in the euro area than in the United 
States and that the degree of wage bargaining centralization and percentage of employees 
organized in trade unions—factors likely to condition the extent of such ﬂ  exibility—have 
remained largely unchanged. At the same time, there has been a reduction of wage minima 
aﬀecting young people and the implementation of subminimum wage regulations for youths 
in some euro area countries, which some would argue has enhanced wage ﬂ  exibility in certain 
segments of the labor market. Such arguments would suggest that further reforms along similar 
lines would make it easier for countries suﬀering shocks requiring downward wage adjustment 
to cope with the single currency. This would appear to be the ECB’s own view (see the same 
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“Europass”), removing many remaining administrative and legal barriers 
to mobility, coordinating cross- border social security provisions through the 
introduction of a European health insurance card, and making occupational 
pension rights more portable.
Note, however, some uncomfortable implications of this advice. Facilitat-
ing labor mobility within the monetary union implies reinforcing barriers 
to immigration, legal and illegal, from outside the union. Australia allows 
citizens of New Zealand to work freely in its country, and vice versa, but 
only New Zealand permits the relatively free immigration of citizens of 
Fiji.43 Customs and immigration oﬃcials in Australia spend much of their 
time repatriating illegal Fijian immigrants entering through New Zealand, 
straining the arrangements designed to ensure integration of the two na-
tional labor markets. In the European context, limiting the strains on the 
labor markets of the countries on the receiving end of the labor ﬂ  ow and 
hence the political fallout may require limiting immigration from outside 
the union. Among other things, this may mean limiting labor mobility from 
North Africa and the Middle East, regions where earnings diﬀerentials 
vis-  à-  vis the European Union are large and where the eﬃciency eﬀects of 
freer labor mobility would be especially pronounced.44 Harsh treatment of 
undocumented immigrants from these countries may also create strains with 
their governments, which would not be helpful for a European Union that 
is trying to encourage democratic values and market-  oriented economic 
development in what is sometimes referred to as “Wider Europe.”
One can even imagine diﬀerential treatment of workers from EU member 
states that have and have not adopted the euro. Allowing, indeed encourag-
ing, workers to relocate freely within the monetary union would become 
more uncomfortable politically if workers from member states outside the 
euro area were also permitted to freely migrate to relatively prosperous euro 
area member states. One can imagine political pressure to situate the immi-
gration ring-  fence at the borders of the euro area, not at the borders of the 
European Union itself. In the short run, this would create problems for the 
Schengen Agreement, which has been implemented by Denmark and Swe-
den, as well as most euro area member states.45 In the longer run, it is likely 
to create strains between EU members inside and outside the fence and to 
disrupt the operation of the single market. The idea that euro area member 
states would only take measures to further enhance labor mobility among 
themselves if there was also a credible barrier against immigration from 
tiny, prosperous Denmark is not especially compelling, but one can imagine 
such concerns becoming serious if and when, say, Turkey is admitted to the 
European Union.
43. For whose foreign policy it has traditionally borne responsibility.
44. For arguments to this eﬀect, see Rodrik (2002) and Bhagwati (2003).
45. And, by Norway and Iceland.40    Barry  Eichengreen
Measures to enhance the countercyclical use of ﬁ  scal policy are the other 
reforms pointed to by the literature on optimum currency areas. European 
countries are uncomfortable with their loss of monetary autonomy, because 
having tied the monetary hand behind their backs, they have little scope for 
using ﬁ  scal policy countercyclically. Inherited debt ratios are high, which 
means that increasing deﬁ  cit spending in slowdowns threatens rating down-
grades and increases in borrowing costs. The Stability and Growth Pact, 
whatever the practice, in principle limits the scope for discretionary ﬁ  scal 
policy and even automatic stabilizers in countries close to or exceeding its 
3 percent of GDP threshold for excessive deﬁ  cits. To be sure, for countries 
like Portugal, where the problem is excessive labor costs and inadequate 
competitiveness, expansionary ﬁ  scal policy to boost aggregate demand is 
beside the point; the imperative is to cut labor costs, and using ﬁ  scal policy 
might only slow the inevitable adjustment while threatening debt sustain-
ability. Still, one can imagine a variety of other countries suﬀering nega-
tive aggregate demand shocks that can be oﬀset by temporary increases in 
budget deﬁ  cits that would beneﬁ  t from greater freedom to use ﬁ  scal policy 
in countercyclical fashion.
For them, reforms of the Stability and Growth Pact that encourage gov-
ernments to run budgets close to balance or even in surplus in good times 
so that they can allow deﬁ  cits to widen in bad times would make life with 
the euro more comfortable.46 My own view is that reform of the Stability 
and Growth Pact should encourage changes in ﬁ  scal institutions and proce-
dures that work to solve common- pool and free- rider problems and thereby 
contain deﬁ  cit bias in good times.47 The alternative, where the European 
Commission and Council agree to ﬁ  nes and sanctions against countries 
46. To be clear, I am not arguing that the 3 percent ceiling is too low but rather that it leaves 
inadequate room for countercyclical policy, because deﬁ  cits are excessive in good times. There 
are too many alternative reform proposals for these to be usefully surveyed here. See Fischer, 
Jonung, and Larch (2007) for a survey of alternatives.
47. On ﬁ  scal decentralization as a source of common-  pool problems, see Rattso (2003) and 
Eichengreen (2003). My own scheme for reform is as follows. The rationale for the pact is that 
deﬁ  cits today may imply deﬁ  cits tomorrow and that chronic deﬁ  cits will force the ECB to 
provide an inﬂ  ationary debt bailout. But not all deﬁ  cits are equally persistent. Chronic deﬁ  cits 
are a danger only where countries fail to reform their ﬁ  scal institutions. Countries with large 
unfunded pension liabilities, such as Greece and Spain, will almost certainly have deﬁ  cits down 
the road. Where workers are allowed to draw unemployment and disability beneﬁ  ts indeﬁ  nitely, 
deﬁ  cits today signal deﬁ  cits tomorrow. Countries that have not completed privatizing public 
enterprise, such as France, are similarly more likely to ﬁ  nd future ﬁ  scal skeletons in the closet. 
Where revenue-  sharing systems that allow states and municipalities to spend today and to be 
bailed out tomorrow, central governments will almost certainly suﬀer chronic deﬁ  cits. Thus, 
the pact should focus not on ﬁ  scal numbers, which are arbitrary and easily cooked, but on 
ﬁ  scal institutions. The Council of Ministers could agree on an index of institutional reform, 
say, with 1 point each for privatization, pension reform, unemployment insurance reform, and 
revenue- sharing reform. It should then authorize the European Commission to grade countries 
accordingly. Those receiving 4 points would be exempt from the Stability and Growth Pact 
guidelines, as there is no reason to expect that they will be prone to chronic deﬁ  cits. The others, 
in contrast, would still be subject to warnings, sanctions, and ﬁ  nes.The Breakup of the Euro Area    4 1
whose deﬁ  cits are deemed excessive, assumes a level of political solidarity—
a Europe in which diﬀerent nationalities view themselves as members of a 
common polity, such that a majority of members can impose ﬁ  nes and sanc-
tions against a renegade minority—that does not exist and that is unlikely 
to exist for the foreseeable future. In the absence of deeper political integra-
tion, in other words, a stability pact with anything resembling the current 
structure is unlikely to be enforceable.48
The same conclusion applies to proposals to strengthen the operation 
of the monetary union by supplementing it with a European system of ﬁ  s-
cal federalism. A system of temporary transfers among member states or 
an expanded EU budget where contributions and expenditures are keyed 
to a member state’s relative economic situation could provide an alterna-
tive to a national monetary policy as a buﬀer during periods of cyclical 
divergence.49 Economic activity would be more stable, because intracoun-
try transfers would render demand more stable. But making such transfers 
eﬀective would require signiﬁ  cant expansion of the EU budget, especially 
insofar as the majority of that budget is tied up in agricultural subsidies 
and ongoing transfers to relatively low-  income member states. And again, 
signiﬁ  cantly increasing the share of tax revenues that member states pay to 
the European Union and whose disposition is then decided by the member 
states as a group would require a level of political solidarity that does not 
exist.
Another way of thinking about this is that ﬁ  scal federalism is an insurance 
pool through which members of the monetary union that are temporarily 
better oﬀ assist their brethren who are temporarily worse oﬀ—participants 
require a system of collective self-  help if they are going to willingly expose 
themselves to the vicissitudes of monetary union. Rodrik (1996) has made 
an argument like this to explain why more open economies have larger gov-
ernments—their citizens are willing to expose themselves to the risks of 
trade openness only if they can count on help from their stronger neighbors 
in the event of a temporary worsening of their economic situation due to 
international competition. The analogy here is that countries suﬀering tem-
porary unexpected economic costs as a consequence of their participation 
in the monetary union would accept the latter only if they can temporarily 
48. This argument has a long lineage; see, inter alia, Kindleberger (1973) and Eichengreen 
(1997). As De Grauwe (2006) puts it, while the European Commission decides when a coun-
try’s deﬁ  cit is excessive and when its government must therefore cut spending and raise taxes, 
it is the national government that must implement those tax increases and spending cuts and 
that will be rewarded or punished for doing so by its constituents. In contrast, the commission 
cannot be replaced, except in the event of dereliction of duty. In eﬀect, the commission—and 
therefore the Stability and Growth Pact—lacks democratic legitimacy. It will continue to lack 
such legitimacy until European political integration proceeds further and results, inter alia, in 
direct election of the commission.
49. Early inﬂ  uential statements of this view were Inman and Rubinfeld (1992) and Sala-  i-
  Martin and Sachs (1992).42    Barry  Eichengreen
expect transfers from their neighbors to buﬀer the eﬀects. The diﬀerence is 
that Rodrik’s argument applies to citizens of the same country, whereas the 
present argument concerns transfers between sovereign states. One suspects 
that the citizens of diﬀerent countries will be less enthusiastic about giving 
money to one another; lacking a common national identity, they lack the 
requisite political solidarity, absent signiﬁ  cant steps toward political inte-
gration at the European level.50 The European Union is made up of diverse 
national identities, and absent a sense of European identity, resistance to 
such transfers may be considerable.51 At the level of the European Union, 
there is also the question of whether a system of interstate taxes and trans-
fers could be agreed on for a subset of member states—those participating 
in the monetary union—without the active involvement of noneuro area 
members.
A similar implication ﬂ  ows from the observation that the risk of a breakup 
could be reduced by enhancing the democratic accountability of the ECB. 
The modern literature on monetary policy distinguishes a central bank’s 
operational independence and democratic accountability. A central bank 
should have the independence to select and implement its tactics indepen-
dent of political pressures, but in choosing the objectives at which those 
tactics are directed, it should be answerable to the polity. National central 
banks ultimately answer to national legislatures, which have the power to 
alter their statutes in the event that those responsible for the formulation of 
monetary policy are perceived as pursuing objectives inconsistent with their 
mandate—where the latter is decided by the polity as a whole.52
But in Europe, there is no euro area or EU government that can act as an 
eﬀective counterweight to the ECB.53 The powers of the European Parlia-
ment are limited relative to those of national parliaments and legislatures. 
50. In addition, Rodrik’s premise and central result have been questioned by Alesina and 
Wacziarg (1998), who argue that the actual association is between government spending and 
country size, with small countries both spending more on public consumption and being more 
open to trade.
51. Thus, authors such as Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) show that more diverse political 
jurisdictions are less likely to provide public goods, including coinsurance against shocks, to 
their residents.
52. Some authors (for example, Alesina and Tabellini [2007, 2008]) argue that the need 
for democratic accountability of independent agencies like the ECB can be overstated. They 
argue that EU member states have shown themselves prepared to accept limited democratic 
accountability for such institutions as the price for policy eﬃciency, pointing not just to the 
ECB but also to the case of the European Commission. My own view is that the eﬀort to draft 
a European constitution (including the Nice Summit that preceded the constitutional conven-
tion and the Brussels Summit that followed it) point to a deep and abiding desire in Europe for 
the adequate democratic accountability of such institutions.
53. Accountability can be deﬁ  ned and provided in diﬀerent ways; see, in the context of the 
ECB, Bini-  Smaghi (1998), Buiter (1999), Issing (1999), and De Haan and Eijﬃnger (2000). By 
referring here to democratic accountability, I attempt to distinguish accountability of policy-
makers to democratically elected politicians from other mechanisms for accountability—for 
example, accountability to the public through the mechanism of public opinion, achieved 
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The Parliament holds hearings at which the president of the ECB delivers 
a statement and answers questions but cannot threaten to replace the presi-
dent in the event of disagreement over objectives. The mandate of the ECB 
is a matter of international treaty, signed by the governments of the member 
states, and cannot be altered by the Parliament. Altering it requires the unan-
imous consent of the member states, which would be a formidable obstacle 
in practice.54 This means that the ECB is less democratically accountable 
than the typical national central bank. In turn, this leaves less cope for the 
European polity to inﬂ  uence its objectives. In the event of serious disagree-
ment, political groups that object to how the central bank chooses to opera-
tionalize its mandate are likely to choose exit over the relatively ineﬀective 
option of voice.55
Making voice more attractive would require giving the European Par-
liament more power to reﬁ  ne the institution’s mandate and replace the 
president and perhaps other members of the board in the event of serious 
disagreement over objectives.56 But there was a reluctance to signiﬁ  cantly 
enhance the powers of the European Parliament during the constitutional 
convention process of 2003/  2004, reﬂ  ecting majority sentiment against cre-
ating anything resembling a European government. And even limited steps 
in that direction were resisted by the French and Dutch electorates in their 
referenda on the draft constitution. This is a reminder that monetary union 
without political union is problematic.57 Because the latter is not likely to 
change anytime soon, collapse of the former cannot be dismissed out of 
hand.
1.9      Coda: The 2008 Financial Crisis
The ﬁ  nancial crisis that spread from the United States to Europe in 2008 
suggested yet another scenario for the breakup of the euro area.58 The crisis 
led to suggestions that a country experiencing a severe banking crisis and 
incurring high costs of bank recapitalization might feel impelled to abandon 
the euro. If such costs were to exceed the ﬁ  scal capacity of the state, a govern-
54. De Haan and Eijﬃnger (2000) observe that the power of the European Parliament to 
alter the ECB statute is quite limited. They state that they “would prefer that, in the case of the 
statute of the ESCB, the European Parliament should have the ﬁ  nal say and thus could act as 
a real parliament” (402), but they don’t explain how to bring this about.
55. In principle, there are alternatives to democratic accountability, as previously noted. But 
given the diﬃculty of modifying the central bank’s statute or ousting members of its board, 
reﬂ  ecting the treaty-  based nature of its structure, it can be argued that these provide an inad-
equate substitute.
56. Alternatively, and less desirably in my view, this power could be delegated to another 
political body such as the Eurogroup (the group of ﬁ  nance ministers of the members of the 
euro area).
57. As emphasized by De Grauwe (2006).
58. As readers who have gotten to this point will have inferred, most of the present chapter 
was drafted prior to those events.44    Barry  Eichengreen
ment and its central bank might resort to the inﬂ  ation tax to augment that 
ﬁ  scal capacity. Levying the inﬂ  ation tax at the national level presupposes the 
existence of a national currency. Hence, a state in these dire straits might feel 
impelled to abandon the euro and to reintroduce its national unit.
The basic issue is familiar to aﬁ  cionados of the literature on monetary 
union: it is the feasibility of monetary union without ﬁ  scal union. The Euro-
pean Union has only a relatively small budget—less than 2 percent of EU 
GDP—much of which is tied up in the Structural Funds and Common 
Agricultural Policy. There is no federal ﬁ  scal mechanism for transferring 
resources to a member state suddenly confronted with high bank recapi-
talization costs. At the same time, economic and ﬁ  nancial integration (as 
cemented by the price transparency aﬀorded by the adoption of a common 
currency) has led some countries to specialize in the production of ﬁ  nancial 
services. They have grown very large formal and shadow banking systems 
that in extreme circumstances may require a large public capital infusion 
in order to survive. In the absence of federal ﬁ  scal arrangement, a member 
of the monetary union, prevented from resorting to the inﬂ  ation tax, may 
lack the public resources adequate to carry this out. Countries like Belgium, 
where the value of short-  term bank liabilities approached three times GDP 
in mid-  2008, illustrate the point.
The height of the crisis saw considerable discussion of this scenario: “For 
Europe, this is more than just a banking crisis,” Munchau (2008) wrote. 
“Unlike in the US, it could develop into a monetary regime crisis. A systemic 
banking crisis is one of those few conceivable shocks with the potential to 
destroy Europe’s monetary union. The enthusiasm for creating a single cur-
rency was unfortunately never matched by an equal enthusiasm to provide 
the correspondingly eﬀective institutions to handle ﬁ  nancial crises. Most of 
the time, it does not matter. But it matters now. For that reason alone, the 
case for a European rescue plan is overwhelming.” Evans-  Pritchard (2008) 
made a similar point: “Who in the eurozone can do what Alistair Darling 
has just done in extremis to save Britain’s banks, as this $10 trillion house 
of cards falls down? There is no EU treasury or debt union to back up the 
single currency. The ECB is not allowed to launch bail-  outs by EU law. 
Each country must save its own skin, yet none has full control of the policy 
instruments. . . . This is a very dangerous set of circumstances for monetary 
union. Will we still have a 15-  member euro by Christmas?”
The answer depends in part on the arithmetic. On a monetary base of 
€1.35 trillion, the euro area would take in roughly €100 billion by running an 
inﬂ  ation rate of 15 percent; this assumes that an interest elasticity of demand 
for base money is one- half and that inﬂ  ation feeds through into interest rates 
one for one.59 From this should be deducted the additional interest payments 
that would have to be paid on the previously existing public debt as a result 
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of abandoning the euro; the estimates in section 1.7 suggest that this might 
amount to an additional 10 basis points. On €6 trillion of euro area debt, 
this would add $6 billion to debt- servicing costs. While the resulting revenue 
is not inconsequential, it pales in comparison with the roughly €2.5 trillion 
of aggregate tax receipts in the euro area.60
More important, however, would be the other adverse ﬁ  nancial eﬀects. 
The analysis of previous sections suggests that the banking-  crisis-  leads- 
to- serious- discussion- of- euro- abandonment scenario would play out as fol-
lows. The decision to reintroduce the national currency would require the 
passage of a law. It would also require the redenomination into that currency 
of domestic bank liabilities, public debt, mortgage and credit card debts, 
and wage contracts. The relevant legislation would be complex, and in a 
democracy, crafting and passing it would take time. Meanwhile, knowing 
what was coming—depreciation of the new national unit against the euro, 
the involuntary conversion of domestic assets into the new national unit, 
and their depreciation against euro- denominated assets—there would be an 
incentive to engage in asset substitution. This is precisely the banking crisis 
scenario previously described.
It might be objected that the country was already in the throes of a bank-
ing crisis—why worry about creating a problem that already exists? But 
the expectation that other domestic ﬁ  nancial assets would be involuntarily 
redenominated and then devalued against the euro would surely cause addi-
tional capital ﬂ  ight. In response, bond markets would have to be shut down. 
The stock market would have to be shut down. This policy response would 
require not just a bank holiday of nonnegligible length but also a ﬁ  nancial 
holiday—all markets would have to be closed for a nonnegligible period.61 
This would have high costs for the eﬃciency of resource allocation and the 
reputation of the country’s ﬁ  nancial markets.
Meanwhile, there exist a number of alternative approaches to dealing with 
the challenge of bank recapitalization. Most obviously, governments could 
agree to share the costs. Typically, banks whose liabilities are a multiple of 
GDP have large cross-  border operations and multinational ownership. In 
Belgium, for example, the banks with such large short-  term liabilities are 
not solely owned by Belgians. Fortis was so highly leveraged because it had 
purchased Dutch Amsterdam-  Rotterdam Bank operations, impelling the 
60. It also is small relative to the €1.5 trillion that euro area members devoted to recapitaliza-
tion of their banking systems in mid-  October 2008, at the height of the ﬁ  nancial crisis.
61. One can also imagine resorting to the parallel-  currency scenario previously discussed. 
Euros would still be used for most transactions, while the parallel domestic unit would be used 
to recapitalize banking system. Banks (and other eventual holders) could then exchange the new 
parallel currency for euros as they wished on the foreign exchange market. The parallel domes-
tic currency would presumably quickly begin to trade at a discount. The “bad” money would 
promptly begin driving out the “good” one. In other words, there would be additional capital 
ﬂ  ight on the part of those holding euro-  denominated claims. This approach would similarly 
seem to lead ultimately to the imposition of a moratorium on all ﬁ  nancial transactions.46    Barry  Eichengreen
Dutch to help with the bailout. Similarly, Belgium, France, and Luxem-
bourg cooperated in recapitalizing Dexia, a heavily Belgium- based mortgage 
lender. In the longer run, euro area countries and EU members more gener-
ally could agree on formal cost-  sharing rules.
Alternatively, recapitalization might be done without resorting to public 
funds. Buiter (2008) has suggested an across-  the-  board debt equity conver-
sion in reverse order of seniority: to resolve the crisis, existing debt would 
be involuntarily converted into equity, possibly preferred. Zingales (2008) 
advocates prepackaged bankruptcy: banks entering into this procedure 
would have old equity holders wiped out and their existing long- term bonds 
and commercial paper converted into equity. To protect the shareholders 
of solvent institutions against expropriation, they would be allowed indi-
vidually to decide whether to buy out debt holders at the face value of their 
debt. If access to ECB credit was limited to banks that had undergone this 
procedure, solvent banks with no need for ECB funds would not undergo 
the procedure, but others would.
Third, recapitalization could be carried out using already-  available ﬁ  scal 
resources. It is not obvious that 10 percent of GDP, which is what it typically 
takes to resolve a banking crisis, is beyond the ﬁ  scal capacity of European 
states. Adding 10 percent of GDP to the public debt at a 2 percent real 
interest rate makes for two-  tenths of a percent of GDP of additional debt 
service. One should add ancillary costs—notably, higher interest rates on 
outstanding debt and crowding out of private investment—but these num-
bers are still not unreasonable.
Be this as it may, if the euro area survives the stresses roiling ﬁ  nancial 
markets in the latter half of 2008—a series of events that are increasingly 
referred to as the most serious ﬁ  nancial crisis of our lifetimes—then the 
hypothesis of this chapter can be said to have passed its ultimate test.
1.10    Conclusion
The possibility that an incumbent member of the euro area might rein-
troduce its national currency cannot be excluded. The European Union is 
still an entity whose residents identify themselves as citizens of nation states. 
Diﬀerences in national history and identity imply diﬀerences in preferences 
over monetary policy. Monetary union by its nature entails compromises 
and trade-  oﬀs. Member states must agree on a common monetary policy 
that in some cases is not any nation’s optimum. By choosing to remain mem-
bers, countries trade oﬀ the costs of a suboptimal monetary policy against 
other beneﬁ  ts.
Where there are compromises and trade-  oﬀs, it is possible that changes 
in circumstances may lead to a change in commitments. A country that 
experiences an asymmetric shock may ﬁ  nd the costs of following policies 
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previously, to now be prohibitive. A country that sees its monetary union 
partners appointing less inﬂ  ation-  averse central bankers to the ECB board 
may similarly decide that the costs of accepting the common policy, while 
previously tolerable, are now prohibitively high.
How formidable are the obstacles to withdrawing? Economically, it is not 
clear which way the arguments cut. A country contemplating exit in order to 
obtain the kind of real depreciation needed to address problems of chronic 
slow growth and high unemployment would be deterred if it thought that its 
eﬀorts to engineer a real depreciation would be frustrated by the inﬂ  ation-
ary response of domestic wages and prices, or if it thought that leaving the 
monetary union would signiﬁ  cantly raise its debt-  servicing costs. But if the 
defector strengthens the independence of its central bank and the eﬃciency 
of its ﬁ  scal institutions, then it is at least conceivable that these negative 
economic eﬀects would not obtain.
In contrast to some other authors, I have argued that the technical and 
legal diﬃculties of reintroducing the national currency, while surmountable, 
should not be underestimated. But the political domain is where the most 
serious obstacles to withdrawing reside. A country that withdraws from 
Europe’s monetary union would be seen as disregarding its commitments 
to other euro area members. Such a country would not be welcomed in the 
meetings where the future architecture of the European Union is discussed 
and where policy priorities are decided. Insofar as member states value their 
participation in these political discussions, they would incur signiﬁ  cant costs. 
The “insofar” in the preceding sentence is of course an important caveat. Be 
that as it may, my own assessment is that the high value that member states 
attach to the larger European project would prevent them from exiting from 
the monetary union, except under the most extreme circumstances.62
Would defection by one country cause the general disintegration of the 
euro area? As with many things economic, the answer is, “it depends.” For 
other countries experiencing the same economic problem, there might be a 
strengthened incentive to follow. If Italy left, owing to inadequate competi-
tiveness and slow growth, and depreciated its national currency against the 
euro, other euro area members suﬀering from inadequate competitiveness 
and slow growth would feel greater discomfort and a greater temptation to 
follow. If Germany left, owing to high inﬂ  ation, and allowed its national 
currency to appreciate against the euro, then other euro area members that 
were similarly uncomfortable with the rate of inﬂ  ation would experience still 
higher import prices and again would be more tempted to follow suit.
But if economic problems in the defecting country were the converse of 
those of its partners in the monetary union, then the opposite conclusion 
might obtain: the rump union could be rendered more cohesive. Similarly, 
62. This is a speciﬁ  c application of the general conclusion drawn by Cohen (2000) that mon-
etary unions have tended to be stable when they are interwoven into a fabric of related ties.48    Barry  Eichengreen
if the country exiting the union had diﬀerent preferences, independent of 
diﬀerences in national economic circumstances, its departure might make it 
easier for the remaining members to agree on a policy more to their liking 
and render the residual union more cohesive. The ﬁ  rst set of eﬀects is likely 
to be of negligible importance if the departing country is small but of greater 
signiﬁ  cance if it is large. The second set of eﬀects would be independent of 
country size insofar as ECB policy is decided on the basis of one country, 
one vote.
The analysis here has focused on scenarios for the next ten years. What 
about longer horizons? The longer the euro survives, the less likely it would 
seem that a participating country would see reintroducing its national cur-
rency as a logical treatment for its economic ills. Markets adapt to the single 
currency, rendering attempts to tamper with it correspondingly more costly. 
Expectations adapt to its existence: having no ﬁ  rst-  hand experience with 
alternatives, residents take the existence of a European currency as the nor-
mal state of aﬀairs and come to regard the reintroduction of a national 
currency as beyond the pale. Notwithstanding the fact that it experienced 
a very severe asymmetric shock in the form of Hurricane Katrina and was 
disappointed by the assistance it then received from its partners in the U.S. 
currency union, the state of Louisiana did not contemplate abandoning 
the dollar and introducing its own currency, even though a sharp depre-
ciation might have been appropriate for addressing some of its economic 
problems.63 
At the same time, other developments could make the breakup of the euro 
area more likely. There could be a diplomatic and political falling out, say, 
over foreign policy. In a world of dirty bombs and terrorist cells, a member 
state could experience an asymmetric shock of suﬃcient magnitude that a 
dramatic real depreciation was seen as essential and the costs of abandoning 
the euro were trivial in comparison. The possibilities are endless.
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Comment  Martin Feldstein
I’m pleased to be a discussant of Barry Eichengreen’s chapter about whether 
the euro and the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) will 
survive.
Before turning to the substance of this interesting chapter, I should say 
something regarding the views about the euro that I expressed before its 
launch a decade ago (Feldstein 1992, 1997, 2007). Contrary to what many 
people think, I did not express doubts about whether the EMU could be 
launched or whether it could survive. My concern in those papers was that 
the single currency would have undesirable long-  term economic and po-
litical eﬀects, including higher average unemployment in the euro zone and 
a weakening of the political alliance between Europe and the United States. 
I shall not pursue those ideas here.
Barry has given us a careful and balanced analysis of the possibility that 
one or more members of the EMU will leave the monetary union in the com-
ing decade. He concludes that one country leaving in the next ten years is 
unlikely, and a complete breakdown of the EMU during that period is even 
less likely. He notes that it is diﬃcult to predict beyond ten years but suggests 
that a political marriage that lasts ten years is likely to keep going.
I will begin by discussing Barry’s analysis and then go beyond his frame-
work to consider two other reasons why one or more members of the EMU 
might choose to abandon the euro.
The draft that Barry circulated at the conference was dated May 2008, 
Martin Feldstein is the George F. Baker Professor of Economics at Harvard University and 
president emeritus of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
This is a comment on a paper with the same title presented by Barry Eichengreen at Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research Conference in Milan, Italy, on October 17, 2008 (revised 
November 2008).